Financial globalization is still far from complete four decades after the end of the Bretton Woods System primarily due to transaction costs and informational frictions. In this study, we ask if global supply chain relationships help firms access cross-border financing in the international capital markets. Comparing two firms that are otherwise similar in covariates and pre-formation outcome through a matching difference-indifferences strategy, we observe the firm that has formed global supply chain relationships to access more cross-border financing, after the global supply chain formation. This result is supported empirically by all major financing vehicles, including stock cross-listing, bond issuance, bank loans, and M&A deals, and is robust to controlling for strategic disclosure concerns. The estimated effect of global supply chain relationship formation on cross-border financing is stronger for firms in countries with stronger accounting and ethical standards and for small and growth firms, but weaker for firms in countries with tighter capital controls and more volatile exchange rates. This suggests global supply chain formation helps cross-border financing more through information production, not cashflow relocation or re-denomination.
Introduction
There are two major components in the economic aspects of globalization, supply chain globalization and financial globalization. Supply chain globalization is defined as global linkages through cross-border procurement of goods or services. It offers firms the advantage of cost-savings (Li, 2013) , access to materials or production capabilities that may be unavailable domestically (Jain, Girotra, and Netessine, 2014) , cutting-edge technology and specialized knowledge (Peter H. Gray, 2004, Berry and Kaul, 2015) , policy support such as tax subsidy, etc. Financial globalization is defined as global linkages through cross-border financial flows. In theory, financial globalization promotes diversification and risk-sharing benefits (French and Poterba, 1991 , Lewis, 1999 , Van Wincoop, 1999 , lower financing costs (Stulz, 2005 and Henry, 2000) , promotion of specialization (Imbs and Wacziarg, 2003, Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen, and Yosha, 2003) , and better allocation of the world's supply of capital (Feldstein and Horioka, 1980, Lucas, 1990 ) through cross-border financing.
While supply chain globalization has matured, financial globalization is still incomplete, primarily due to transaction costs and informational frictions. Therefore, finding ways to improve access to cross-border financing is crucial to reap the benefits of globalization fully.
In this study, we make a crucial contribution to the literature on financial globalization by showing that the establishment of global supply chain relationships helps firms access financing in international capital markets.
Despite the fact that the benefits of both globalization forms have been widely studied, to the best of our knowledge, the association between a firm's decision on global goods and service market transactions and cross-border financing has not been addressed.
1 In this paper, we fill this gap by providing evidence that the establishment of firm-level global supply chain relationships predicts sustained increases in the focal firm's cross-border financing deals, relative to otherwise similar firms.
To initiate our analysis, we create a unique dataset from multiple different sources. We gather information on global supply chains from FactSet Revere and merge that with global public firm financials from Thomson Reuters Worldscope. This data collection produces comprehensive global supply chain networks involving 90 countries or regions, 13,345 publiclisted firms, and 515,748 unique firm-level global supply chain links. We further acquire cross-border financing deals from four major financial markets with our global supply chain data, including 192,736 global bond issuance from Thomson Reuters Datastream, 1,620 cross-listings from major depositary-receipt banks and stock exchanges, 224,316 global loans from Thomson Reuters Dealscan, and 45,553 global M&A deals from Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum. Then, we merge them by fuzzy name matching with our global supply chain data 2 .
In this way, we create unique merged data containing the global goods and services market and the global financial market at the firm level. We hypothesize that global supply chain facilitates cross-border financing, for the following reasons. First and foremost, global supply chain formation provides investors and financial intermediaries favorable information about the firm. The action of a foreign counterparty entering into a goods and services market relationship with the firm is a positive signal regarding the quality of the product, operations and cash flows of the firm. This information production role of global supply chain potentially helps alleviate information frictions and facilitates cross-border financing for the firm. Furthermore, global supply chain formation allows the firm to relocate part of its cash flows to another country and potentially also to redenominate it in another currency, helping the firm overcoming capital controls or matching investors' currency preferences in seeking foreign investment. A panel analysis confirms that controlling for firm characteristics and using different fixed effect specifications, firms with more global supply chain relationships (GSC) have a higher likelihood of acquiring cross-border financing (CBF) across a broad set of markets, including bond issuance, cross-listing, loan origination, and M&A deals as the target, which further helps motivate the main hypothesis.
In the next step, we use a difference-in-differences strategy with careful matching to investigate the impact of GSC formation on firm accessing CBF. We match not only on pre-formation covariates, but also on pre-formation accessing of CBF, and focus on not the overall difference in accessing of CBF, but the difference in the increases in accessing of CBF post-GSC formation. Comparing two firms that are otherwise similar in covariates and preformation outcomes, we observe the firm that has formed global supply chain relationships to have more cross-border financing after the supply chain relationship formation. When a firm switches from having no global supply chain relationships to having at least one, this is associated with an increase in the probability of this firm accessing cross-border financing of 2.5 percent. This result is again supported empirically by all major financing vehicles, including stock cross-listing, bond issuance, bank loans, and M&A deals: This increase in the probability of accessing CBF is most substantial in the bond market (1.7 percent), followed by financing in the M&A market (0.5 percent), then the syndicated loans market (0.3 percent), and finally the cross-listing market (0.1 percent). In the parallel trend analysis, we confirm the ex-ante similarity between the matched treatment firms and the control firms, and observe that only the treatment firms have significantly continued improvement after the establishment of global supply chains.
To provide further identification check to our main result against the possibility of strategic disclosure of GSC, i.e., the possibility that firms might strategically disclose or not disclose supply chain relationships as studied in Ellis, Fee, and Thomas (2012) , we take key advantage of the variation between self-disclosed and counterparty-disclosed GSCs that we are able to observe in our data. When we focus on GSCs disclosed by the counterparty, we find that the effect of GSC establishment on CBF remains strong across the board. While the point estimates focusing on counterparty-disclosed supply chains differ slightly from our baseline estimates, they are not statistically different. This indicates that the effects we document are robust after controlling for strategic disclosure concerns.
We then substantiate the argument that the establishment of global supply chain relationships helps firms better access financing in the global financial market by providing useful signals for overcoming informational frictions. We find that firms already closer to the informational hurdle for accessing financing in the global financial markets -firms situated in countries with higher strength of auditing and better ethical behavior -experience a larger increase in accessing cross-border financing after the formation of a global supply chain relationship. This is consistent with an information-based explanation: That the establishment of GSC provides useful information and sends a positive signal to foreign investors, which in turn enables CBF, and therefore the observed effect on accessing foreign financing should be higher for firms already close to participation prior to global supply chain formation. Providing further support for this explanation, we find that firms with larger expected gains, small and growth firms, also experience larger CBF increases post-GSC formation.
On the other hand, we find less support for the alternative explanation in which GSC enables CBF not through information production, but cash flow relocation and re-denomination. This is because the cashflow relocation and re-denomination hypothesis would predict that the increase in accessing CBF should be larger for firms whose cash flows were previously too barred by capital control and currency risks to be attractive to foreign investors in the global financial market. However, we find the exact opposite, that the post-GSC increase in CBF is stronger for firms situated in countries with looser capital control and smaller exchange rate volatility to begin with.
Taken together, our results provide key managerial insights: That while GSC helps firms substantially in obtaining CBF, it is not an omnipotent tool for completing financial globalization, for its effects in easing the access to financing in the global financing market are most significant for firms closer to the hurdle, not vice versa.
This paper makes three important contributions to the existing literature.
First, we provide the first firm-and link-level evidence that the establishment of global goods and services market relationships associates with a significant increase in global financing transactions, and provide GSC as a brand new determining factor of CBF that is universal across asset classes. Existing studies on the determinants of CBF access usually focus on a single asset class that in each study serve as an ideal setting for testing the effect of the determinant: Rossi and Volpin (2004) documents the role of law and institutions in enabling global M&A deals, while Qi, Roth, and Wald (2010) does so for the foreign bond market; Erel, Liao, and Weisbach (2012) finds that the uniformity of accounting standards matters in the global M&A market, Chen, Ng, and Tsang (2014) does so for cross-listings, and Jayaraman, Kothari, and Ramanna (2016) for syndicated loans; whereas foreign credit supply conditions (Puri, Rocholl, and Steffen, 2011 , Bruning and Ivashina, 2016 , Gao and Jang, 2018 , lender risk and currency preferences (Haselmann and Wachtel, 2011), Ivashina, Scharfstein, and Stein (2015) influence access to the syndicated loan market. In contrast, we document the consistent effect of GSC establishment in enabling CBF across equity-listing, bond issuance, M&A, and syndicated loan markets, which suggest that GSC is a crucial determinant in enabling firms to access global financing across all major formal capital markets.
Second, we take the extant literature on trade and finance and home bias to the next stage by using link-level supply chain data merged with deal-level financial flow data to measure the extent and the barriers to financial globalization, compared to the literature's previous reliance on country-level data. Pioneering work on home bias including French and Poterba (1991) on portfolio holdings and Lucas (1990) on capital flows point out that despite considerable investment diversification and capital allocation benefits, financial globalization is far from the level predicted by such benefits. More recent literature in trade furthers the understanding of home bias by documenting that in the cross-section of country-pairs, international portfolio holdings are negatively correlated with physical distance and informational cost, and positively correlated with trade flows. Our study is consistent with this view but overcomes a key challenge, namely that distance and trade flows across countries are sticky, but GSC formations at the firm-level offer variations at a large scale. Combined with a matching difference-in-differences strategy, our study provides identification for the hypothesis that trade enables finance, and provides managerial insights for how firms can potentially overcome home bias to access CBF.
Third, we are among the first to study firm-level supply chains at the global level, as prior empirical work either focus on global country-level trade flows or domestic firm-level supply chains.
3 Our global supply chain dataset offers two key advantages. On the one hand, the 3 Empirical supply chain literature include studies look at supply chains in relation to disruption events global nature of the dataset enables supply chain studies over a global sample of firms across different informational, institutional and economic environments, which allows our estimates to apply to firms operating in a diverse set of potentially different backgrounds. In turn, the variations in the estimated effects allow us to test alternative mechanisms through which GSC helps CBF. On the other hand, the dataset captures information about the direction of disclosure for each supply chain relationship. This information allows us to be among the first to gain insights into the rich interplay between strategic disclosure and the enabling effect of GSC on CBF. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our data and sample construction using automatic and manual textual matching. Section 3 develops our main hypothesis and the empirical strategy. Section 4 reports our main results including the parallel trend analysis for the matching difference-in-differences specification. Section 5 addresses strategic disclosure using variations in self-versus counterparty-disclosed supply chains. Section 6 investigates mechanism and heterogeneity for the results. Section 7 concludes.
Global Supply Chain & Cross-Border Financing Data
We assemble a comprehensive dataset of global supply chain relationships and crossborder financing deals on major markets include equity, bond, M&A, and syndicated loans. Our primary universe of study is all global public firms from Thomson Reuters Worldscope and we obtain annual financial variables from that database. Our global firm-level supply chain information is from FactSet Revere. Our cross-border financing records of four major financial markets are obtained from different sources as described below.
Data sources for GSC and CBF
Our global supply chain relationships are from FactSet Revere. FactSet Revere handcollects and verifies supply chain information from a wide range of sources of different languages globally, including public filings, sell-side presentations, press releases, firm websites, product catalogs, and major news media. FactSet monitors a company's 10-K filing, investor presentations, and websites on an annual basis, while a company's press releases and corporate actions are monitored daily. Therefore, FactSet Revere provides a more complete (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008 , Cen, Dasgupta, Elkamhi, and Pungaliya, 2016a , Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers, 2008 and network characteristics (Barrot and Sauvagnat, 2014 , Cen, Maydew, Zhang, and Zuo, 2016b , Campello and Gao, 2016 . Besides Compustat segment data (SFAS 14, SFAS 131), recent work uses FactSet Revere supply chain dataset as it offers better coverage and richer information including global coverage (Agca, Babich, Birge, and Wu, 2017 , Schiller, 2017 , Osadchiy, Schmidt, and Wu, 2018 Table 1 . The first column shows the country name. The second column shows the total number of unique firms in that country that involved in the global supply chain networks. The other cells in the lower triangle of the matrix represent the number of unique global supply chain observations involving two firms, one in the column country and the other in the row country. For example, in the second row, we can observe that our sample capture 949 public firms in Japan and there are 9085 unique supply chain relationships between Japan and the United States. The United States has the largest number of companies and global supply chain coverage, followed by Japan, the United Kingdom, and Germany. This table implies that our sample has covered a major part of public firms for all major countries.
[Insert Table 1 near here]
Our cross-border financing observations are assembled from a battery of different sources for four distinct financial markets: bond, equity, syndicated loans, and M&A.
A corporate bond functions as a non-intermediated debt between an investor and a corporation. For the cross-border bond issuance, our data comes from Thomson Reuters Datastream, where we collect 192,736 global bond issuance in the same period of our global supply chain data. Figure 1 Panel A shows the distribution of global bond issuance deals from firms in each country. The United States has the largest number of bond issuance deals (22%), followed by the United Kingdom (13%), France (9%), etc. The coverage distribution on cross-border bond issuance is similar to that in global supply chains.
Cross-listing is when a firm issues its equity shares on foreign stock exchanges or sell its shares as bank depositary receipts (DRs). We hand-collect 1,620 cross-listings from major DR banks (BNY-Mellon, JP Morgan, Citi, Deutsche Bank, etc.) and exchanges (NYSE, NASDAQ, etc.) . Figure 1 Panel B shows the distribution of equity cross-listing deals from firms in each country. China has the largest number of cross-listing deals (24%), followed by Canada (14%), United Kingdom (11%), etc. The global supply chains in those countries are also active.
Global loan origination refers to the case that a firm borrows a loan from a foreign bank or a group (syndicate) of lenders led by a foreign bank. We collect 224,316 global loans from Thomson Reuters Dealscan. Figure 1 Panel C shows the distribution of global loan origination from firms in each country. The United States has the largest number of transactions (13%), followed by Australia (8%), United Kingdom (8%), etc.
Global M&A suggests that a firm or its subsidiary is the target in a M&A deal. We collect 45,553 global M&A deals from Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum. Figure 1 Panel D shows the distribution of M&A deals (as the target) from firms in each country. The United States has the largest number of such deals (17%), followed by United Kingdom (8%), China (8%), etc.
[Insert Figure 1 near here]
Sample construction by fuzzy name-matching
Since security ID are unreliable at the global level, and some cross-border financing data do not have reasonable ID coverage, we use fuzzy name matching algorithms and manual checks with cross-validation to construct our sample. In this way, we create a unique merged sample data containing the global goods and services market as well as the global financial market at the firm level.
The specific steps are as shown in Figure 2 . To begin with, we combine firm-level fundamental information from Worldscope with global supply chain relationship from Factset Revere using SEDOL, as SEDOL has both consistent and reliable coverages in both datasets. Then we merge firm-level fundamental information with cross-border financing deals from different sources. Since there is no reliable security ID to combine those datasets, we use fuzzy name matching technique.
[Insert Figure 2 near here]
In order to do fuzzy name matching, we first use python package (cleanco) to remove suffixes and special symbols in company names. Then we use the fuzzy character string matching algorithm to relate company names from the four CBF datasets with Worldscope company name respectively. We pay particular attention to the names of parent firms and their multiple subsidiary firms in the M&A market. For companies that do not result in an exact match, we perform a manual match with groups of two research assistants who conduct the nexis-lexis web search to make judgments. If different judgments occur, we review them again using a third research assistant. We also check the quality of the linking procedure repeatedly 5 . In our final data sample, we find that the number of companies using manual match contributes to 40% of the number of companies on all matches. Figure 3 is the time-series statistics for the global supply chains and the CBF deals each year. GSC is the number of newly established global supply chain relationship. CBF if the number of new cross-border financing deals. As we can see in Figure 3 , the time trend of new cross-border financing deals is consistent with that of the establishment of the global supply chain relationship. There also seems to be a lead-lag relation between new global supply chains and new CBF deals, which is in line with our main research hypothesis. In the following section, we describe our identification strategy.
[Insert Figure 3 near here]
Hypothesis and Empirical Strategy
In this section, we describe the main hypothesis and propose our identification methodology to test the main hypothesis.
We conjecture that in the presence of informational frictions in the global financial market, the establishment of global supply chain relationships provides useful goods market information to help firms better access cross-border financing.
Hypothesis 1: Comparing two firms that are otherwise similar, the firm that has formed global supply chain relationships (GSC) will have more access to cross-border financing (CBF) after the supply chain formation.
To test this hypothesis, We first proceed with a panel estimation and then use a differencein-differences strategy with careful matching to identify the causal impact of GSC establishment on firm accessing CBF.
Panel regression
To motivate our main hypothesis, we employ the following panel regression specification:
where CBF it is the dummy variable indicating firm i has cross-border financing in year t. GSC it is the number of global supply chains firm i has in year t. Controls it include ROA it (return on assets), netsales it (net sales), netsalesgrowth it (net sales growth rate). γ t is the year fixed-effect dummy variable. δ i is the firm fixed-effect. This specification can be thought of as a difference-in-differences on the continuous treatment variable GSC it under the assumption that firms are homogeneous up to firm controls and firm fixed effects.
DID with Matching
To address the potential alternative explanations, for the main identification we estimate a difference-in-differences model for the treated group with their respective matched samples. Comparing two firms that are otherwise similar in the data, i.e. the pair shares a common trend before one of them forms global supply chain relationships, our main hypothesis suggests that the firm that has formed global supply chain relationships to have more cross-border financing after the formation time of its global supply chain relationships.
We use Mahalanobis distance matching to identify the control group based on the prior 3-year's net sales, net sales growth, and ROA. We also match on the exact type of crossborder financing, the exact value of the firm's 2-digit standard industry classification (SIC) code, and the firm's country. The exact type of cross-border financing means the incidence of cross-border financing in the last three years. For each treated observation, we match two controlled observations.
The specification for DID is below. We conduct DID with matching for each of the four financial markets separately as well as for the aggregation of all CBF deals.
where T reated i is a dummy set to 1 if the firm i is treated, i.e. has any global supply chain relationship in any year of the sample period. P ost it is a dummy variable set to 1 for the treatment firm and its matched control firms if any global supply chain relationship has been established for the treated firm by year t. β 2 is the DID estimate of the treatment effect of global supply chain relationship on cross-border financing. γ t is the year fixed-effect dummy variable. δ i is the firm fixed-effect. As we use the firm fixed effect, T reated i does not need to appear as a standalone term in the specification. Table 2 presents the results for panel regression, which are consistent with the prediction that global supply chain relationships have a significant impact on firms' global bond issuance, global equity listing, global loan origination, global M&A deal, as well as the overall aggregated market.
Main Results

Panel Regression
[Insert Table 2 near here]
We report panel regression results separately for four markets as well as for the aggregated all CBF deals. The dependent variable CBF it is the dummy variable indicating firm i has any corresponding CBF deal in year t, and the main explanatory variable of interest is global supply chains measured in log numbers. In Column (1) we present the univariate regression results, and Columns (2)- (6) adds various combinations of controls, firm fixed effects and year fixed effects. We find large and significant associations between global supply chain and cross-border financing: Going from zero to one global supply chain relationship associates with an increase in the probability of accessing cross-border financing of 1 to 4 percent, across specifications.
The large and significant coefficients of the global supply chain on cross-border financing we find in the panel regressions motivates us to further investigate the causal impact of global supply chain formation on firms accessing cross-border financing and its timing. Therefore, we conduct a difference-in-differences (DID) analysis with careful matching next to rule out alternative explanations.
Difference-in-Differences with Matching
Using the matching criteria discussed in the previous section, a treated firm which has global supply chain relationships during our research period are matched to two control firms with similar firm attributes. Table 3 shows the results for DID regression. The interaction term, T reated i ×P ost it , is the DID estimate of the treatment effect of global supply chain relationships on cross-border financing, which is significantly positive for all markets, including stock cross-listing, bond issuance, bank loans, and M&A deals, as well as for the aggregated CBF market. This suggests that comparing two firms that are otherwise similar, we empirically observe the firm that has formed global supply chain relationships to have more access to cross-border financing after the supply chain formation. This main identification supports our hypothesis and also consistent with our previous attempts.
[Insert Table 3 near here]
The interaction term, T reated i × P ost it , the DID estimate of the treatment effect of global supply chain relationships on cross-border financing, also shows that the effects are economically large. When a firm switches from having no global supply chain relationships to having at least one, this leads to an increase in the probability of this firm accessing crossborder financing of 2.5 percent. We further observe that this increase in the probability of accessing CBF is largest in the bond market (1.7 percent), followed by financing in the M&A market (0.5 percent), then the syndicated loans market (0.3 percent), and finally the cross-listing market (0.1 percent).
The controls in the DID with matching regressions include firm fixed effects as well as time fixed effects. Therefore, the estimated increase in the probability of accessing CBF following GSC formation is not driven by any unobservable time-invariant characteristics of the treated firms, or any aggregate trends in global supply chain and cross-border financing activities. Note, however, we need to further check whether the parallel trends assumption is satisfied in the matched sample, so that the DID estimate is not driven by ex-ante differences in CBF activities prior to GSC formation. We analyze for the parallel trends next.
Testing for Parallel Trends
The parallel trend assumption is most critical in DID. It requires that in the absence of treatment, the difference between the treatment and the control groups is constant over time. We confirm parallel trends by the following test.
where F 2.P ost it is a dummy variable set to 1 for the treatment firm and its matched control firms if any global supply chain relationship has been established for the treated firm by year t + 2. If T reated it × F 2.P ost it is statistically insignificant, then CBF does not increase before the global supply chain formation, suggesting the parallel trend assumption holds. This is confirmed by Table 4: We also plot for the difference between the treatment and the control groups as well as their respective means with confidence intervals for the yearly window of [-3,5 ]. As Figure 4 shows, the trend of the treated group is almost the same as that of the control group before the establishment of global supply chains, meaning that the two groups have similar crossborder financing probability for all financial markets. After the formation of global supply chains, only the probability of cross-border financing for the firms in the treated group starts to improve significantly.
[Insert Figure 4 near here]
While parallel trends is satisfied for all four markets and that the GSC/non-GSC difference in accessing CBF is statistically significant for a sustained period of at least three years, Panel (a) of Figure 4 shows that for cross-listing the effect in the first year of GSC formation is much larger than in the second year and beyond. On the other hand, Panels (b)-(d) of Figure 4 show that the GSC/non-GSC difference in accessing CBF is much more permanent and does not decay in a period lasting up to five years for bond, M&A, and syndicated loans markets. We think this difference between cross-listing and the rest stems from the fact that because of its uniquely broad investor base with the large presence of both retail and institutional investors, the equity market is informationally very different, and the possibility of strategic disclosure arises, that firms announce GSC for the advantage in accessing CBF. This possibility leads us in the next section to use the advantage of the FactSet data to test and further show that our main result, that global supply chain leads to firms accessing cross-border financing, is robust even after controlling for strategic disclosure.
To sum up, in the parallel trend analysis, we confirm that the ex-ante similarity between the treatment firms and the control firms, and observe that only the treatment firms have significantly continued improvement after the establishment of global supply chains.
Robustness Check on Timing of GSC Establishment
When we focus on the relationship between global supply chains and cross-border financing, we thought of a problem which comes first, CBF or global supply chains. We want to make sure global supply chains happen first than CBF, which is consistent with our hypothesis.
However, there is a situation where the news of cross-border financing is slightly delayed. In order to verify our conjecture, we delete all observations in which CBF happens before or no later than 30-day after the formation of global supply chains. As Table 5 shows, even if we delete those that can be blurred, our results are still significant. The parallel trend is still consistent in Figure A1 (Appendix).
[Insert Table 5 near here] 5. Self-Disclosure vs. Counterparty-Disclosure
In this section we discuss a key threat to identification in the empirical supply chain literature -strategic disclosure, i.e. the possibility that firms might strategically disclose or not disclose supply chain relationships as studied in Ellis et al. (2012) -and how we take key advantage of the variation between self-disclosed and counterparty-disclosed GSCs that we are able to observe in our data to overcome this longstanding challenge.
Specifically, we find that when we focus on GSCs disclosed by the counterparty, we find that the effect of GSC establishment on CBF remains strong across the board, with the exception that the economic magnitude decreases in cross-listing, but not in bond, syndicated loans, and M&A markets. This indicates that first, the effects we document are robust after controlling for strategic disclosure concerns and second, that strategic disclosure incentives may be strong prior to obtaining financing in the cross-listing market but not in bond, syndicated loans, and M&A markets.
The idea is as follows: There is a potential issue of selective disclosure, i.e. firm announces global supply chain relationships only when it wants to access cross-border financing. However, introduces measurement error in observations where a firm for whatever reason does not want cross-border financing but does have global supply chain relationships, which biases our estimate toward zero. In order to know the impact of selective disclosure, we compare estimates from self-disclosed relationships and estimates from counterparty-disclosed relationships. Assuming that counterparty-disclosed relationships are less susceptible to selective disclosure, they are more informative signals of the quality of the firm. Therefore, we conjecture that counterparty-disclosed relationships should lead to a larger increase in the firm's access to financing in the global financial market.
Hypothesis 2: The increase in cross-border financing after the formation of global supply chain relationships is stronger for firms for which the supply chain formation event is passively disclosed and therefore more informative.
Factset allows us to test Hypothesis 2 and implement this additional identification check. As Table 6 shows, the results we expected were still significant when we changed the treated sample to a counterparty disclosed sample. The firm that has formed global supply chain relationships to have more cross-border financing after the formation time of its global supply chain relationships. Compared with the previous regression results, the cross-term coefficient becomes smaller. This indicates that the company will make strategic disclosures. And selfdisclosure has the biggest impact on the global equity listing market, indicating global equity listing is intuitively influenced by strategic disclosure. In other markets, global supply chain relationships' impact on cross-border financing is very persistent, indicating global supply chain relationships' causal effect on cross-border financing is more important for the other three markets with relatively few previous studies. As presented in Figure A2 (Appendix), the results of parallel trend get stronger as they are more informative.
[Insert Table 6 near here]
Mechanism and Heterogeneity
In this section, we substantiate the argument that the establishment of global supply chain relationships helps firms better access financing in the global financial market by providing useful signals for overcoming informational frictions.
Informational Environment
Firms in our sample operate in countries with different quality of information environment. Suppose that the establishment of a global supply chain relationships provides the same incremental certification to the firm, because we observe the financing benefit of the supply chain relationship establishment event only if the incremental certification is enough to carry the firm over the hurdle required by foreign investors, we conjecture that the observed increase in accessing of cross-border financing after the global supply chain formation should be higher for firms closer to the hurdle prior to the formation event, i.e. firms in countries with a better informational environment, including firms in countries more developed ("North"), with a higher strength of auditing, or with better ethical behavior.
Hypothesis 3: The increase in cross-border financing after the formation of global supply chain relationships is stronger for firms closer to the hurdle of cross-border financing preformation (in countries where local institutions/informational environment are better).
Is our result larger in the subsample of firms for whom we expect the informational role of the supply chain is stronger? So we made regression on different samples.
6.1.1. "North" vs. "South" Countries
We divide "North" and "South" countries by GDP per capita using the International Comparison Program database by World Bank. A country ranked among top 50% GDP per capital is defined as a "North" country with an indicator variable set to 1, which is interacted with the product term in DID specification to identify the incremental effect of the difference between "North" and "South" countries. Even though literature suggest globalization potential benefit is larger in the "South" (developing countries), yet actual take-up is much smaller in the South as shown in Table 7 . Cross-border financing in the "North" countries is more enhanced by the formation of global supply chains.
[Insert Table 7 near here]
Strength of Auditing
We collect the data on the strength of auditing from the World Economic Forum. A country ranked among top 50% in the strength of auditing has an indicator variable set to 1, which is interacted with the product term in DID specification to identify the incremental effect of the difference between the high and low strength of auditing. As our results in Table 8 shows, firms situated in countries with higher strength of auditing get more benefits from global supply chain relationships in terms of cross-border financing.
[Insert Table 8 near here]
Ethical Behavior of Firms
We collect the data on the ethical behavior of firms similarly from the World Economic Forum. A country ranked among top 50% in ethical behavior has an indicator variable set to 1, which is interacted with the product term in DID specification to identify the incremental effect of the difference between high and low ethical behavior. As our results in Table 8 shows, firms situated in countries with better ethical behavior get more benefits from global supply chain relationships in terms of cross-border financing.
[Insert Table 9 near here]
Potential Benefits
Furthermore, suppose the establishment of a global supply chain relationships brings about the same reduction in informational costs, we should expect that firms for which cross-border financing brings stronger potential benefits to be more likely tipped over the hurdle for accessing the global financial market. Therefore, we conjecture the observed increase in assessing cross-border financing should be larger for firms with larger expected gains in the cross-border financing markets.
Hypothesis 4: The increase in cross-border financing after the formation of global supply chain relationships is stronger for firms for whom the expected gains from cross-border financing is larger. (small. growth)
Small vs. Large Firms
We define the firms with net sales ranked among bottom 50% as small firms, otherwise as large firms
7 . An indicator variable is set to one for a small firm, which is interacted with the product term in DID specification to identify the incremental effect of the difference between small and large firm sizes. As Table 10 shows, small firms get more benefits from global supply chain relationships in the cross-border financing markets.
[Insert Table 10 near here]
Growth vs. Value Firms
We define the firms with net sales growth rate ranked among top 50% as growth firms, otherwise as value firms. An indicator variable is set to one for a growth firm, which is interacted with the product term in DID specification to identify the incremental effect of the difference between growth and value firm types. As Table 11 shows, faster-growing firms have greater possibilities to cross-border financing after global supply chain formation.
[Insert Table 11 near here] 7 We use the variable netsales instead of other size variables due to its high coverage in Thomson Reuters Worldscope.
Industry Breakdown
In addition to small vs. large and growth vs. value, we ask whether the increase in cross-border financing we find following global supply chain formation is driven by firms in specific industries, or whether it is prevalent across industries. We group 2-digit SIC industries into 17 industry groups, and run matching DID regressions of overall accessing of cross-border financing on the event of global supply formation for each industry group subsample. Table 12 shows the industry group subsample results. As the industry group subsample results indicate, the increase in cross-border financing post global supply chain formation is a prevalent phenomena across industry group. We find positive point estimates for all 17 industry groups, of which 13 are statistically significant at the 5% confidence level. The mean and median estimates across industry groups are 0.0274 and 0.0252 respectively, similar to the full sample estimates of 0. 266 in Table 3 . Overall, the industry group subsample results show that the increase in cross-border financing following global supply chain formation is not driven by firms in specific industries.
[Insert Table 12 near here]
Cashflow Relocation/Re-denomination
In addition to information production, an alternative mechanism through which global supply chain formation might be linked to accessing financing in a foreign country is cashflow relocation/re-denomination. Consider a domestically-operated firm that wants to issue the bond to foreign investors, but is located in a country with tight capital controls or with volatile exchange rates. For this hypothetical firm, the establishment of a global supply chain relationship moves part of the previously all-domestic revenue stream to outside its base country and potentially also reduces the currency risks faced by its potential foreign investors. If as opposed to the information production mechanism, the cashflow relocation/redenomination mechanism is driving our results, we should expect that the observed increase in assessing cross-border financing be larger for firms in countries with tighter controls of capital flows or countries with more volatile exchange rates.
Hypothesis CR:
The cashflow relocation/re-denomination mechanism is important and the increase in cross-border financing after the formation of global supply chain relationships is stronger for firms in countries with tighter capital controls or with higher exchange rate risks.
Capital Control
We obtain the dataset on capital control from Fernández, Klein, Rebucci, Schindler, and Uribe (2015) and create an indicator set to 1 for countries ranked top 50% in the tightness of capital control. Table 13 shows the improvement on cross-border financing is stronger for firms situated in countries with weaker (not stronger) capital control.
[Insert Table 13 near here]
Exchange Rate Volatility
Furthermore, we obtain the dataset on exchange rate volatility from Clark, Wei, Tamirisa, Sadikov, and Zeng (2004) and create an indicator set to 1 for countries ranked top 50% in the exchange rate volatility. Table 14 suggests the increase in cross-border financing is significantly more pronounced for firms situated in countries with less (not more) exchange rate volatility.
[Insert Table 14 near here] Taken together, the results in Table 13 and 14 do not lend support to Hypothesis CR. Therefore, while we find support for Hypothesis 3 & 4, we find the opposite result to the predictions of Hypothesis CR. We interpret this as suggesting that the mechanism of global supply chain relationships in increasing cross-border financing is more likely through information production instead of through alleviating capital mobility or currency mismatch.
Summary of Mechanism and Heterogeneity
To sum up, we examine various mechanism and heterogeneity and find the following firms have larger benefit in cross-border financing: firms in developed countries ("North" firms) as they are closer to the hurdle, small and growth firms as they have large expected gain, firms situated in countries with higher strength of auditing and better ethical behavior, as well as firms situated in countries with less capital control and less exchange rate volatility.
Our heterogeneity results in testing Hypothesis 3, 4 & CR provides managerial insights on which firms benefit more in the global financial market by participating in the global supply chain. Moreover, these heterogeneity results suggest that while GSC helps firm in obtaining CBF, it is not an omnipotent tool: its effects are largest for firms closer to the hurdle, not vice versa. The heterogeneous effects we document are also more consistent with an information-based explanation, that the establishment of GSC provides useful information and sends a positive signal to foreign investors which enables CBF; these results, especially regarding capital controls and exchange rate volatility, offer less support for the alternative hypothesis that GSC enables CBF through the relocation and/or the re-denomination of cash flows.
Conclusions
In this paper, we bridge two major components in economic globalization, supply chain globalization and financial globalization. We identify that global supply chain relationships help firms access cross-border financing in the international capital markets. The establishment of global supply chains predicts sustained large increases in cross-border financing, relative to otherwise similar firms, in all major financing vehicles, including cross-listing, bond issuance, bank loans, and M&A deals. The evidence strengthens for bond issuance, bank loans, and M&A deals but not for cross-listing when we focus exclusively on passivelydisclosed global supply chains. Overall, our results suggest that global supply chain integration is a powerful driver of cross-border financing, across major asset classes.
However, despite the large overall effects, our evidence suggests that the global supply chain is not an omnipotent tool for advancing financial globalization and for curing home bias. While we identify at the firm level, that increasing trade integration through global supply chain leads to increases in accessing cross-border financing, this effect of global supply chain is stronger for firms closer to the hurdle of cross-border financing, i.e. firms in more developed countries with relatively better domestic informational environments, and for whom the expected gains from cross-border financing is larger, i.e. small and growth firms. This cautions that the financial integration through global supply chain integration would not eliminate all barriers to financial globalization.
Finally, our paper takes a first step on the potential benefits of global supply chain integration on cross-border financing and financial globalization, and the estimates in this paper are admittedly only an important part of such benefits. There are potentially two additional benefits that we have not addressed. First, by focusing on the extensive margin of whether to access cross-border financing, we ignore intensive margin effects of funding cost reduction. The intensive margin effects might accrue not just to firms already participating in the global financial markets, for even firms raising funds exclusively in the domestic market can gain through competition from an easier-to-access cross-border financing option. Another benefit we do not capture, is the amplified effect of global supply chain on cross-border financing through the feedback effect,
8 that the initial increase in accessing cross-border fi-nancing further helps firms to bond with foreign stakeholders. 9 In turn, this further benefits firms' supply chain integration, and cross-border financing, and so on. Both additional benefits of the global supply chain relationships are potentially important. We leave further investigation into future work. 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 24%   14%   11%  7%  4%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  1%  1%  1%  1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 5%  4%  3%  3%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  2%  1%  1%  1%  1%  1%  1%  1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Global Bond Issuance
Global Equity Listing
Global Loan Origination
Global M&A Deal Notes: The specific steps are as shown below. To begin with, we combine firm-level fundamental information from Worldscope with global supply chain relationship from Factset Revere using SEDOL. Then we use fuzzy name matching technique to merge firm-level fundamental information with cross-border financing deals from different sources. The specific steps are as follows: 1) we first use python package (cleanco) to remove suffixes and special symbols in company names; 2) we use fuzzy character string matching algorithm to relate company names from the four CBF data with Worldscope company name respectively; 3) for companies that do not result in exact match, we perform a manual match with a group of two research assistants using nexis-lexis online web search to make decisions. is the dummy variable indicating firm i has cross-border financing in year t. We report global bond issuance, global equity listing, global loan origination, global M&A, as well as the overall aggregated market. GSC it is the number of global supply chains firm i has in year t. Controls variables include return-on-assets (ROA), net sales, net sales growth rate. Year fixed-effect and firm fixed-effect are included as indicated. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. * , * * and * * * indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
CBF company name
log(1+#Global_Supply_Chain) 0.0419*** 0.0410*** 0.0160*** 0.0137*** 0.0134*** 0.0116** Table 3 : Difference-in-differences estimation results.
Notes: This table shows the results of DID regression. The dependent variable is the dummy variable indicating firm i has cross-border financing in year t. We report global bond issuance, global equity listing, global loan origination, global M&A, as well as the overall aggregated market. T reated i is a dummy set to 1 if the firm i is treated, i.e. has any global supply chain relationship in any year of the sample period. P ost it is a dummy variable set to 1 for the treatment firm and its matched control firms if any global supply chain relationship has been established for the treated firm by year t. β 2 is the DID estimate of the treatment effect of global supply chain relationship on cross-border financing. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. * , * * and * * * indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Table 4 : Parallel trend assumption estimation results.
VARIABLES
Notes: This table presents the testing for parallel trends. The dependent variable is the dummy variable indicating firm i has cross-border financing in year t. We report global bond issuance, global equity listing, global loan origination, global M&A, as well as the overall aggregated market. T reated i is a dummy set to 1 if the firm i is treated, i.e. has any global supply chain relationship in any year of the sample period. P ost it is a dummy variable set to 1 for the treatment firm and its matched control firms if any global supply chain relationship has been established for the treated firm by year t. F 2.P ost it is a dummy variable set to 1 for the treatment firm and its matched control firms if any global supply chain relationship has been established for the treated firm by year t + 2. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. * , * * and * * * indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Notes: This table presents the results of DID regression after we delete all observations in which CBF happens before or no later than 30-day after the formation of global supply chains. The dependent variable is the dummy variable indicating firm i has cross-border financing in year t. We report global bond issuance, global equity listing, global loan origination, global M&A, as well as the overall aggregated market. T reated i is a dummy set to 1 if the firm i is treated, i.e. has any global supply chain relationship in any year of the sample period. P ost it is a dummy variable set to 1 for the treatment firm and its matched control firms if any global supply chain relationship has been established for the treated firm by year t. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. * , * * and * * * indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
